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-
- CA-89:05
- CERT Advisory
- October 17, 1989
- DEC/Ultrix 3.0 Systems
-
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Recently, the CERT/CC has been working with several Unix sites that have
- experienced breakins. Running tftpd, accounts with guessable passwords
- or no passwords, and known security holes not being patched have been the
- bulk of the problems.
-
- The intruder, once in, gains root access and replaces key programs
- with ones that create log files which contain accounts and passwords in
- clear text. The intruder then returns and collects the file. By using
- accounts which are trusted on other systems the intruder then installs
- replacement programs which start logging.
-
- There have been many postings about the problem from several other net
- users. In addition to looking for setuid root programs in users' home
- directories, hidden directories '.. ' (dot dot space space), and a modified
- telnet program, we have received two reports from Ultrix 3.0 sites that
- the intruders are replacing the /usr/bin/login program. The Ultrix security
- hole being used in these attacks is only found in Ultrix 3.0.
-
- Suggested steps:
- 1) Check for a bogus /usr/bin/login. The sum program reports:
- 27379 67 for VAX/Ultrix 3.0
-
- 2) Check for a bogus /usr/etc/telnetd. The sum program reports:
- 23552 47 for VAX/Ultrix 3.0
-
- 3) Look for .savacct in either /usr/etc or in users' directories.
- This may be the file that the new login program creates. It
- could have a different name on your system.
-
- 4) Upgrade to Ultrix 3.1 ASAP.
-
- 5) Monitor accounts for users having passwords that can be found in
- the /usr/dict/words file or have simple passwords like a persons
- name or their account name.
-
- 6) Search through the file system for programs that are setuid root.
-
- 7) Disable or modify the tftpd program so that anonymous access to
- the file system is prevented.
-
- If you find that a system that has been broken into, changing the password
- on the compromised account is not sufficient. The intruders do remove copies
- of the /etc/passwd file in order to break the remaining passwords. It is best
- to change all of the passwords at one time. This will prevent the intruders
- from using another account.
-
- Please alert CERT if you do find a problem.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Thank you,
- Ed DeHart
- Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)
- Software Engineering Institute
- Carnegie Mellon University
- Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
-
- Internet: cert@cert.sei.cmu.edu
- Telephone: 412-268-7090 24-hour hotline: CERT personnel answer
- 7:30a.m.-6:00p.m. EST, on call for
- emergencies other hours.
-
- Past advisories and other information are available for anonymous ftp
- from cert.sei.cmu.edu (192.88.209.5).
-
-